Showing posts with label George Osborne. Show all posts
Showing posts with label George Osborne. Show all posts

Monday, 15 August 2016

MMT vs the bond market

Why do governments borrow from the bond market? Is there a better way for governments to finance their deficits than this? If so, what economic factors should determine where governments need to look for finance? These are questions that I have been asking myself over the past few months and years, but I seem to be in a minority. Certainly most mainstream economists don't seem to be that bothered, but I think they should be because it is becoming pretty obvious that the old ways don't work any more.

This week the Bank of England cut interestrates to 0.25% and embarked on a new wad of quantitative easing (QE) in a bid to head off recession. Now I pointed out a few years ago that lowering interest rates to near zero will have practically no effect on stimulating extra demand for credit and so will not create new demand via increased consumer spending in the real economy either. Only a fiscal stimulus will do that but this government has set itself against doing anything that remotely resembles Keynesian interventionism. But as I pointed out last time, even governments that are supposed to believe in Keynesian economics have consistently failed to apply sufficiently large fiscal stimuli during major recessions.

Yes they increase welfare spending, but only because unemployment has increased and that has forced their hand. Meanwhile, they compensate by cutting spending in other areas to try and minimise total borrowing. These cuts often further increase unemployment and lower GDP. This leads to the austerity that we have been familiar with over the last eight years, and while welfare spending has still increased, it has often been undertaken grudgingly and parsimoniously. Consequently, while government spending increases, it does not increase fast enough to reverse the effects of the recession. The result is the recession is longer and deeper than it needed to be and chancellors like George Osborne continuously miss their deficit targets.

So while the government may claim that their actions are Keynesian because they are increasing spending and borrowing in the recession, their actions cannot in any way be considered to be within the spirit of Keynesianism because they make no attempt to restore the economy to full employment or maximum output. But this failure to adhere to Keynesian orthodoxy is not totally ideological. As I pointed out previously, the last Labour government was almost as obsessed with deficit reduction post-2008 as the Tories have been. What drives this fiscal trepidation is fear and loathing about debt. In the aftermath of the 2007 crash the worry was all about debt to GDP ratios and sovereign default. We were bombarded with threats to our credit rating from the very credit agencies that partially created the financial crisis in the first place. We were told that if we borrowed too much we would end up like Greece. But all this was bogus economic scaremongering for two reasons.

Firstly, unlike Greece we had control of our own currency, and secondly all our debt was denominated in our own currency. No developed country has ever defaulted on its sovereign debt when that debt has been denominated in its own currency. But there is another more important point that needs to be appreciated when it comes to sovereign debt. Who you borrow from matters just as much as, if not more than, how much you borrow.

To see this consider these two examples. Greece currently has a debt to gdp ratio of 180%. As a result most economists consider Greece to be essentially bankrupt and incapable of paying back what it owns. Most expect it to default sooner or later. Japan on the other hand has an even higher debt to gdp ratio of 230% but no-one expects Japan to go bust. Why?

The answer is because Greece owes virtually all its debt to foreign creditors (ECB, IMF, German and French banks) in a currency that it cannot print, cannot control, and cannot devalue. Even if Greece left the euro its new currency would devalue and its economy shrink relative to its economic competitors, but its debt would not. So its debt to gdp ratio would skyrocket even further.

Japan's debt on the other hand is owned mainly by its own citizens and domestic banks and corporations and is also denominated in its own currency. The Japanese government can never fail to repay its debts because it can always raise taxes on the people it owes money to in order to pay them the money it owes them. As a result it can never run out of money and the money it pays out in interest and maturity repayments never leaves the Japanese economy. The only risk to the Japanese government is loss of confidence by the public in the government and a rush to liquidate the bonds they hold, but this can be avoided in two ways. Either the government can impose fixed maturity dates on the bonds or savings, or it can borrow from itself in the form of its central bank (like QE). This latter mechanism is the essence of what is known as modern monetary theory or MMT, which I will discuss further in a future post, and what this and previous posts are intended to provide the justification for.

What this shows is that when it comes to national debt, borrowing from within your own currency area is more sustainable than borrowing from outside it. In short, countries that borrow internally instead of externally from the bond market can never go bust. This is one major reason why countries should shun the bond market, but there are other good reasons as well.

Every time a government borrows from overseas it is adding to the current account deficit. The UK gilts created are in effect exchanged for foreign currency which can then be used to purchase additional goods from overseas. This happens without an equal amount of production having taken place inside the UK and then exported. Alternatively, the foreign currency is first converted to sterling in order to buy the gilts, thereby leading to a strengthening of sterling on the currency markets. Neither of these effects is desirable.

So what is clear is that conventional methods of government borrowing come with a significant sting in the tail, and yet as QE has shown, these stings are often unnecessary and could be avoided. So why does most of the mainstream economic community not appear to get this? Why don't they recognise that there might be better ways for governments to finance their deficits and to run the economy?

Well one reason that they continue to use the bond market is perhaps because that is what they have always done. In the times before fiat currency and free flows of capital governments needed to physically borrow other people's money in order to spend it. Money creation was not possible. But I think there is a deeper problem. Economists don't think like physicists. A physicist will always tackle a problem by simplifying it to its core. This means first considering a closed system problem and then looking at system leakage as a perturbation to that initial system. Economics on the other hand seems obsessed with open systems, globalisation and free trade.

What I think MMT could do is allow a government to more effectively internalise its economy and protect its currency. It could enable it to borrow unlimited funds (from its own central bank) in a recession in order to enact a proper Keynesian response to a financial crisis. This in turn could be used to fund investment, job creation or helicopter money which would be far more effective than cutting interest rates to zero or providing QE for banks. The result could be much greater macroeconomic control and shorter and shallower recessions.

Thursday, 11 August 2016

Who is afraid of the bond market? The paradox of Keynesianism

One of the added benefits of Brexit is that it has finally forced the government to kill off George Osborne's tenure at No. 11 Downing Street and thus abandon his insane attempts to balance the country's finances through austerity. But it would nevertheless be unfair to blame George Osborne entirely for the austerity of the last six years. Why? Because he was only doing what most mainstream economists and the opposition Labour Party were telling him to do, only doing it better.

The problem is this. Cast your mind back to the 2010 general election and remind yourself of the options that were available to the electorate. In essence there were only two: Osborne with his austerity-max, and the Labour Party with its austerity-lite. Neither were very appealing, but more pertinently, neither had any basis in macroeconomic theory, or more specifically in that part we consider as pure Keynesianism.

According to Keynes, the appropriate fiscal response of a government in a recession is to cut taxes and increase spending. The aim is to increase aggregate demand in the economy to compensate for the fall that has induced the recession thereby helping to rebuild confidence and restore output to pre-recession levels. Unfortunately there is a problem with this plan: nobody seems to have the necessary bottle to carry it out. This is because the plan as it is conventionally implemented contains a fundamental flaw. That flaw is debt.

In a recession incomes and employment levels fall and hence so too do tax revenues. In contrast unemployment levels rise and so consequently does social security spending. As a result the government budget deficit grows more negative and the national debt increases. And the bigger the recession, the bigger the deficit and so the bigger the borrowing requirement will be. Now in theory this shouldn't matter because a government that prints its own currency can never run out of money, but in practice it does matter because economists and the financial markets obsess about debt to GDP ratios and sovereign default, and driving this fear are the IMF, the bond market and the credit agencies.

The consequence of this is that in a recession when Keynesian theory demands that governments borrow whatever is necessary to get the economy moving again and operating back near full capacity, the bond market is urging caution and threatening to restrict credit. So in 2010 even though UK gilt yields were at historic lows and government borrowing was dirt cheap, all the talk was about reducing borrowing as quickly as possible to prevent market bond rates rising and our credit rating falling. Yet paradoxically, before the crash when the economy was booming and the government should have been discouraged from borrowing, there was no such alarm in the markets about UK debt and borrowing was positively encouraged.

This is the paradox of current Keynesian economics. When your economy is in a deep recession and Keynes says "borrow borrow borrow", the bond market wants to do the opposite. Yet when the economy is booming and Keynes says governments need to operate a surplus, the bond market is quite happy to lend you anything you want. Just ask Gordon Brown.

So in 2010 instead of both main political parties promising to cut taxes, raise welfare payments and increase investment as Keynesian theory demands, both political parties promised to do the opposite, but by slightly different amounts (obviously) in order to at least maintain a pretence of economic and political pluralism. All of this should therefore make economists think seriously and critically about what they really understand by Keynesian policies and how they can implement them because what this clearly demonstrates is that the current paradigm that they adhere to just isn't working. Not only that, it can NEVER work.

Fortunately there is a solution. That solution is Modern Monetary Theory or MMT. (To be continued...)

Monday, 19 March 2012

The Budget 2012: Should George Osborne learn from Barack Obama?

This was the question that Larry Elliott asked on The Guardian's Economics Blog yesterday. He was of course referring to fact that the USA has implemented a major economic stimulus package whereas the coalition government here has instead (with the tacit encouragement of the Treasury) been implementing a policy of cuts and austerity. As a result the USA has had falling unemployment for most of the last year whereas in the UK unemployment is still rising. In the USA economic growth is well over 1% and approaching 2%. In the UK it is barely above zero. So has Obama got it right and Osborne got it wrong?

To answer this we must first take stock of what it is exactly that the US government has done. Its stimulus package has in fact been in three parts. First it reduced its short-term policy rate (just as the Bank of England did). Then it introduced Quantitative Easing (QE), just as the Bank of England did. Then last autumn it launched Operation Twist. This involved buying long-dated bonds to bring down long-term interest rates and replacing them with short-dated bonds, but as Operation Twist is such a new initiative can it really be held responsible for a US recovery which has been underway for over a year now? Probably not, and as Larry Elliott suggested in his column, it is difficult to see how Operation Twist could really effect aggregate demand. So is the real explanation for the difference in recovery rates between the US and the UK just down to the size and length of the stimulus. Perhaps not.

Perhaps the real reason that the US economy is growing faster is not just down to the federal stimulus. A point that is too often overlooked has been the scale and the effect of the housing crash in the US over the last four years. Unlike in the UK where house prices fell by only about 20% from their 2007 peak and are still at historically high levels, in many parts of the US the fall has been much more dramatic. Could this be part of the reason that the US economy has seen a better speed of recovery?

In case you had forgotten, it was the boom in the housing market in both the USA and Britain (and Ireland and Spain for that matter) that led to the financial crash in 2007, rather than just a failure of bank regulation. In all of those countries mentioned the housing bubble was the result of either rising inequality or increasing economic imbalances and, in the case of the US and UK, stagnant growth in real wages for the less well off as well. As a result an excess of investment funds got misdirected into creating bubbles in asset prices (i.e. property) instead of being use to create new means of production.

What is different about the US response to the crisis, compared to the UK one, is that the US allowed their housing bubble to implode. We did not. In fact government policy in the UK is still more concerned about supporting house prices than it is about keeping people in work. That is the big mistake. Negative equity is only an economic problem if people start losing their jobs.

In the USA by contrast, by allowing the housing market to crash the policy makers have forced the debt holders to take a "debt haircut" and thus allowed the economy to partially reset itself. Thus the USA has benefited from a combination of a debt haircut and a stimulus. In the UK we have had a weak stimulus primarily for the banks but no haircut. In the Eurozone (e.g. Spain and Ireland) they might get a small debt haircut but no stimulus. Thus it is the combination of stimulus and debt write-off that is the necessary remedy. Those countries that only take half the medicine either take much longer to recover, or don't recover at all.

However it is not just about the size of the stimulus either. It is also about the shape of it. The correct economic response to the current crisis is not just to provide a stimulus, but to direct that stimulus towards correcting the original cause of the problem, namely the housing market. By building more social housing the government would not only have created jobs, it would also have reduced house prices and private sector rents and thereby increased disposable incomes for the majority of families. That would have magnified the effect of the stimulus and helped to eradicate the core problem. Instead we are having to endure an economic policy that protects the haves at the expense of the have-nots. That is just a repeat of the very economic policies that caused the whole sorry problem in the first place.